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ABSTRACT 
 
Background: Once just a small part of the Medicare program, private managed care plans 
now cover over one-third of all Medicare beneficiaries and cost the Federal government 
approximately $210 billion each year. Importantly, the evolution of Medicare managed 
care policy has been far from linear; for several decades there have been dramatic shifts 
in the payment and regulatory policies facing private Medicare managed care plans. 
Objectives: This article presents a critical review of the history of Medicare managed 
care payment and regulatory policies and discusses the role of political ideology and 
stakeholder influence in shaping the direction of policy over time.  
Conclusions: As Medicare Advantage becomes an increasingly prominent area of focus 
for the health services, health policy, and medical research communities, it is important to 
bear in mind the highly political history of the program, the role of stakeholder influence 
in shaping the direction of policy, and to understand the historic barriers to evidence-
based policymaking.   
Key words: Medicare Advantage, health insurance, health policy 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the passage of the Social Security Amendments of 1972, Medicare 
beneficiaries have been able to choose between participating in the traditional fee-for-
service Medicare program, or enrolling in a private Medicare managed care plan.1 Under 
traditional Medicare, the government reimburses private providers directly. In contrast, 
under Medicare Part C – also known as Medicare Advantage, Medicare managed care, or 
(previously) Medicare+Choice – private health insurance plans receive monthly 
capitation payments from the Federal government to provide Medicare Part A and B 
benefits to enrollees (Table 1). Though initially a small part of the Medicare program, 
over one-third of Medicare beneficiaries are now enrolled in private plans.2 
Over time, there have been substantial shifts in the payment and regulatory 
policies facing Medicare managed care plans. The political rhetoric around Part C would 
suggest that Republicans generally support higher payments and looser regulation of 
private insurers as a means to encourage participation in Medicare and enhance 
beneficiary choice. Democrats, in contrast, have often argued that managed care plans 
should be required to be more efficient than traditional Medicare, and thus should be able 
to operate at a lower cost. While these themes do emerge throughout the history of Part 
C, policymaking in this area has not always aligned quite so clearly with these values. As 
Ted Marmor noted nearly two decades ago, Part C policy has been driven by a 
“complicated combination of politics, policy and circumstance.”3 This largely holds true 
today.  
A key policy challenge lies in squaring the program’s conflicting objectives, 
including reducing Medicare spending, increasing choice, and offering better health care 
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benefits to older adults. However, the political conversation around Part C has rarely 
involved an evidence-based discussion of the policies needed to balance these conflicting 
objectives. As Medicare Advantage becomes an increasingly prominent area of focus for 
the health services, health policy, and medical research communities, an understanding of 
the history and evolution of policymaking in this area – and the limited role that evidence 
has played in policy development – is essential. This article presents a critical 
examination of the history of Medicare managed care payment and regulatory policy and 
discusses the role of political ideology and stakeholder influence in shaping the direction 
of policy over time.  
 
POLICY BACKGROUND: PART C PAYMENT POLICY FROM 1982-2019 
The Early Years: 1982-1997 
When the prospective payment program for private plans in Medicare was first 
introduced following passage of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA) 
in 1982, the motivation was unmistakably to reduce Medicare spending; the decision to 
set the reimbursement rate for plans at 95% of expected costs in traditional Medicare 
represented a concerted effort to reduce per-beneficiary costs by 5%.1 This policy was 
part of a larger effort by the Reagan Administration to cut overall Medicare spending. 
Indeed, another major prospective payment program - diagnosis-related group (DRG) 
payments for hospital inpatient services under traditional Medicare – was introduced in 
1983.4 However, whereas per-beneficiary spending on Part A hospital services declined 
following the introduction of DRGs,5 the prospective payment program for private plans 
proved less successful. With inadequate risk adjustment mechanisms in place, and a 
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pattern of favorable selection into private plans, Medicare’s prospective payments to 
insurers actually exceeded per-enrollee health care costs. Thus, rather than being cost-
saving, the first prospective payment program ended up costing Medicare 5.7% more per 
private plan enrollee.6  
These extra payments, in combination with the ability of private plans to control 
costs through restricted provider networks and stringent managed care mechanisms such 
as pre-authorization requirements for care, meant that, in the years following the 
implementation of the prepaid payment program, private plans were increasingly able to 
offer enhanced benefits – including prescription drug coverage, which was not a standard 
benefit at the time – and lower premiums to enrollees.6 These enhanced benefits attracted 
greater numbers of beneficiaries to private plans. In the seven years from 1990 to 1997, 
enrollment grew from 3.5% to 13.5% of all Medicare beneficiaries.7 However, the overall 
costs to Medicare grew as well, counteracting the original purpose of the prospective 
payment program.  
 
Attempted Cost Control: 1997-2003 
In the late 1990s, it became increasingly clear that managed care plans were a key 
source of rising costs in the Medicare program. There was already significant pressure on 
policymakers to stem the growth in Medicare spending following the 1995 Medicare 
Trustee Report, which described the Hospital Insurance Trust Fund as in need of 
“prompt, effective, and decisive action”.8  Newly reelected Democratic President Bill 
Clinton and the Republican-controlled House and Senate battled behind the scenes to 
agree upon policy solutions to address rising Medicare spending. The result – the 
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Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA) – represented a delicate balance of diverse interests. 
The BBA simultaneously expanded the types of private plans eligible to participate in 
Medicare (including private fee-for-service (PFFS) plans and Medical Savings 
Accounts), while specifically targeting spending on private plans, reducing the annual 
updates to plan payments in an effort to level the playing field with traditional fee-for-
service Medicare.9 In his remarks upon signing the BBA into law, Clinton focused 
exclusively on the cost containment objective of Medicare managed care, stating that the 
BBA “honors our commitment to our parents by extending the life of the Medicare Trust 
Fund for a decade.”10  
Following the passage of the BBA, private insurers began lobbying Congress, 
arguing that the severity of the payment reductions would no longer allow them to offer 
the level of enhanced benefits that kept beneficiaries enrolled in their plans. Eventually, 
Congress eased up on some provisions by introducing new legislation that increased 
payments in certain geographic areas through the Balanced Budget Recovery Act of 1999 
and the Benefits Improvement and Protection Act of 2000.9,6  
Despite these policy changes, pressure from insurers continued to mount over 
time, and some plans exited the Medicare market entirely.7 Over this period, enrollment 
in private plans fell from a high of 18% of all Medicare beneficiaries in 1999 to just 13% 
in 2003 (Figure 1).   
 
The Pro-Competition Era: 2003-2007 
In late 2003, just over two years into his first term, Republican President George 
W. Bush, along with a Republican-led Congress, passed the Medicare Prescription Drug, 
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Improvement and Modernization Act (MMA). Although the introduction of the Part D 
prescription drug benefit was the most widely publicized feature of the law, the MMA, 
which renamed Part C “Medicare Advantage”, also introduced a new benchmark-based 
bidding system for Medicare managed care plans, and included provisions that 
dramatically increased payments to plans, in what was viewed as a concerted effort to 
expand the role of the private sector in Medicare.1 In his remarks upon signing the MMA 
into law, President Bush addressed Medicare managed care at length: 
In addition to providing coverage for prescription drugs, this legislation 
achieves a second great goal. We're giving our seniors more health care 
choices so they can get the coverage and care that meets their needs […] 
And when seniors have the ability to make choices, health care plans 
within Medicare will have to compete for their business by offering higher 
quality service. For the seniors of America, more choices and more control 
will mean better health care.11  
 
There is a clear emphasis on choice and expanded benefits in this address, and along 
these lines, the MMA has since been described as a law that “exemplified the politics of 
benefit expansion rather than that of cost control”.12 
Following the passage of the MMA, the number of Medicare managed care 
contracts grew substantially, and an unprecedented number of Medicare beneficiaries 
enrolled in private plans: enrollment sky-rocketed to 9.7 million, or over 20% of all 
Medicare beneficiaries by 2008 (Figure 1).13 The extra benefits available to enrollees also 
expanded. It was no longer the case that only the most efficiently managed plans offered 
enhanced benefits; the massive increases in payments ensured that nearly all plans 
offered benefits above what was offered through traditional Medicare.14 The new rhetoric 
around Medicare Advantage (MA) was not about efficiency or cost containment, it was 
about expanded benefits and health plan choices.  
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Democratic Rule: 2007-2010 
In 2007, political tides began to shift yet again as the Democratic Party gained a 
majority in the House and Senate. By 2008, the extra payments to MA plans resulting 
from the MMA were costing Medicare an estimated $8.5 billion annually.7 Again 
pushing for cost containment, Democrats proposed new legislation – the 2008 Medicare 
Improvements for Patients and Providers Act (MIPPA) – that would phase out a 
duplicative payment for Indirect Medical Education (effectively lowering payments to 
MA plans) and placing new regulations on the highly profitable, indemnity-style PFFS 
plans, including provider network requirements.15 The MIPPA was passed in both the 
House and Senate by July 9, 2008. President Bush subsequently vetoed the MIPPA, 
though Congress overrode the veto and the MIPPA became law on July 15, 2008.16   
The MIPPA had a notable impact on PFFS plans, with many insurers ultimately 
withdrawing these options from the market following the introduction of the new 
regulations. While the impact can be seen via a decline in the total number of MA 
contracts in subsequent years, little impact was seen on enrollment at the time (Figure 1), 
with many PFFS enrollees transferring into other types of MA plans. 
Medicare managed care payments were dramatically restructured once again 
when Democratic President Barack Obama signed the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (ACA) into law in 2010. The ACA included a number of provisions impacting 
private plans. These provisions included, beginning in 2012, the implementation of a 
gradual reduction in benchmark rates to levels as low as 95% of average fee-for-service 
Medicare costs in counties that ranked in the top quartile for fee-for-service Medicare 
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spending, and as high as 115% of average fee-for-service Medicare costs in counties that 
ranked in the bottom quartile of fee-for-service Medicare spending. These reductions, 
aimed at leveling the playing field both between private plans and traditional Medicare, 
and across counties within Medicare Advantage, were to be phased-in over a period of 
two to six years, depending on the size of the reduction in each county.17  
The ACA also outlined a new system of quality-related bonuses that were 
designed to adjust benchmark rates according to each plan’s quality rating. This ACA 
provision was to be implemented beginning in 2012, however, prior to its 
implementation, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) introduced a 
quality bonus payment demonstration of their own, superseding the ACA provision. This 
CMS demonstration effectively modified the bonus system outlined under the ACA by 
expanding the bonuses to more plans – including those with lower quality ratings – and 
increasing the size of the bonuses. The CMS demonstration provided an additional $10.9 
billion to plans beyond what was outlined under the ACA between 2012-2014.18 At the 
time, many viewed the CMS quality bonus demonstration largely as an effort to take 
some of the sting out of the benchmark rate reductions in order to appease plans and 
stabilize the market. 
In addition to changing the way that county benchmark rates are calculated, the 
ACA included provisions that modified the rebate system. Since 2006, private plan 
payments have been based on a county-level benchmark rate, against which plans submit 
bids representing the cost to provide Part A and B services to enrollees. If a plan’s bid is 
below the county-level benchmark, a portion of the difference between the plan bid and 
the benchmark is returned to the plan in what is referred to as a rebate. Prior to the 
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passage of the ACA, plans received 75% of the difference between their bid and the 
benchmark in the form of a rebate (with the remaining 25% returned to CMS).7 Under the 
ACA legislation, however, plans with lower quality ratings now receive rebates of just 
50% of the difference between their bid and the benchmark; plans with higher quality 
ratings receive up to 70% of the difference.17, 19 
 
Recent Policy Changes: 2019 
On October 3, 2019, Republican President Donald Trump announced his 
Executive Order on Protecting and Improving Medicare for Our Nation’s Seniors.20 
Intended as an explicit response to “Medicare for All” proposals, the Executive Order 
directly promotes expanded plan choice and benefit flexibility. The notion of leveling the 
playing field between MA and traditional Medicare emerges once again, but in this case 
in reverse, with Sec.3 (a) (iii) proposing actions to “ensure that, to the extent permitted by 
law, FFS Medicare is not advantaged or promoted over MA with respect to its 
administration” and Sec.3 (b) proposing identification of options “to inject market pricing 
into Medicare FFS reimbursement.”20  
 
PAYMENT POLICY AND THE ROLE OF THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY 
As outlined above, Medicare managed care policy has shifted numerous times 
over the past three decades. However, this has not been the sole result of pressure exerted 
by politicians; insurers have also had a lot to say about – and a lot of say in – changing 
payment rates and regulatory policies. The insurance industry depends heavily upon 
Medicare Advantage (MA) as a major source of profits; one quarter of all UnitedHealth 
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Group profits and as high as two-thirds of Humana’s profits reportedly came from MA 
products in 2014.21 As the MA program has grown over time, the stakes for insurance 
companies have grown ever greater as well, and as such, lobbying efforts by insurance 
industry representatives have expanded.  
Each spring, CMS announces proposed benchmark rates for private plans 
participating, or contemplating participation in the MA program for the following year. 
Over the last decade, these announcements have ignited heated political debate around 
plan payment policy.  
In the years immediately following the passage of the ACA, scheduled cuts to 
MA payments became quite contentious. Because CMS has broad administrative power 
over MA plan payments, they are entitled to make modifications to payment rates beyond 
what is outlined in the ACA.22 The insurance industry has capitalized on this by putting 
intense pressure on Presidents Obama and Trump, as well as members of Congress, to 
sustain the level of payment generosity that plans became accustomed to under the 
MMA. 
As a key example, the pressure exerted by the insurance industry led the Obama 
Administration to shy away from some of the same proposed cuts that they once 
trumpeted. In December 2008, then President-elect Obama gave a briefing on his 
proposal to reform health care, one of his key campaign platforms. When asked how he 
might fund such a proposal, he mentioned MA specifically, responding:  
We're also going to examine programs that I'm not sure are giving us a 
good bang for the buck. The Medicare Advantage program is one that I've 
already cited where we're spending billions of dollars subsidizing 
insurance companies for a program that doesn't appreciably improve the 
health of seniors under Medicare. 23 
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However, the Obama Administration (and by extension, CMS) later backed off on 
ACA-scheduled cuts to MA payments numerous times, arguably due at least in part to 
intense pressure from the insurance industry. The industry lobbying group America’s 
Health Insurance Plans (AHIP) was particularly active over this period, publishing press 
releases and reports warning that even minor reductions in plan payments would have a 
major impact on enrollees’ coverage.24,25 At the same time, AHIP worked to mobilize 
Medicare beneficiaries via their ‘Coalition for Medicare Choices’ group, releasing 
dramatic print and television advertisements with messaging that MA rate cuts would 
reduce benefits and cause MA enrollees to pay substantially more for their MA 
coverage.26  
AHIP’s efforts were highly effective: In early 2013, CMS announced a 
preliminary plan to cut MA payments by 2.2% in 2014, but after intense lobbying from 
AHIP/the Coalition for Medicare Choices, payment rates ended up being raised by 
3.3%.27 Similarly, in early 2014, CMS announced proposed payment cuts of 1.9% for 
2015.21 With the 2014 midterm elections approaching, many Democrats, fearful of 
alienating an important voting bloc, joined their Republican counterparts in protesting the 
cuts. A February 14th, 2014 letter to then-CMS Administrator Marilyn Tavenner signed 
by a bipartisan coalition of 40 senators – including Ed Markey (D-MA) and Chuck 
Schumer (D-NY) – stated, 
MA has been a great success and should remain a competitive choice for 
our constituents. Unfortunately, continued regulatory changes that affect 
the program’s funding year after year create disruption and confusion 
among beneficiaries who are looking for consistency and predictability. 
[…] Funding stability is key to building upon MA’s successful 
coordinated care health outcomes. We urge you to maintain payment 
levels that will allow MA beneficiaries to be protected from disruptive 
changes in 2015.28 
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Here, the issues of cost containment and efficiency are being sidelined in favor of an 
emphasis on beneficiary choice and quality of care, and particularly, how both would be 
greatly diminished without a continuation of the enhanced payments plans receive. 
Ultimately, payments to plans were not cut, but instead were raised 0.4% for 2015.21  
This pattern has largely continued over time, most recently with payment rates 
scheduled to rise 2.53% in 2020, up from the 1.59% increase initially proposed by CMS 
in February 2019.29 
 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCEThe body of literature relating to Part C raises important 
questions around current payment policies, and calls into question the extent to which the 
purported goals of the program – expanded choice, better healthcare benefits and 
increased efficiency – are actually realized.  
Expanded choice is often cited as a central objective of Part C. Choice in this 
context refers nearly exclusively to choice of health plan, as the restricted provider 
networks characteristic of Part C often mean that provider choice is far more limited than 
within traditional Medicare. Importantly, the literature suggests that the benefits of plan 
choice may not manifest in reality: studies indicate both that beneficiaries struggle with 
the task of comparing and choosing between Part C plans,30 and that seniors generally 
prefer not to change plans, even when doing so may mean better benefits and lower 
costs.31  
A second objective of Part C is to provide better healthcare benefits to 
beneficiaries. Beyond the considerable equity implications of making better benefits 
available only to those enrolled in private plans, some studies have raised questions 
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around whether the bidding process and system of rebates is the most efficient means of 
providing these extra benefits to enrollees. Evidence suggests that somewhere between 
just one-eighth to half of payment increases were passed on to enrollees in the form of 
improved benefits and lower premiums.32,33 In addition, considerations around quality 
arise as well. The ACA provisions awarding bonuses to plans for achieving higher quality 
ratings seem to have had important unintended consequences: MedPAC reports that the 
new quality incentives have generated serious concerns around star ratings gaming, 
wherein insurers merge and consolidate plans and contracts to achieve higher ratings.2  
 Efficiency is another central goal. Plan payments have fluctuated from 95% of 
costs under traditional Medicare in the 1980s to 113% in the 2000s.34 Payment increases 
enacted by Congress were historically justified as a key means of encouraging insurer 
participation in Medicare;34 payment cuts, on the other hand, have often ignited fears of 
market withdrawal.35 However, the literature going back decades suggests not only that 
the association between payment rates and insurer participation may not be as strong as 
the rhetoric might imply, but that there are a number of other factors that have had a 
strong (and sometimes stronger) influence on insurer participation (Table 2). These 
studies call into question much of the political rhetoric around Part C payment policy.  
In recent years, additional efficiency concerns have emerged. Current payment 
methodology incorporates risk adjustment mechanisms that provide larger payments for 
sicker enrollees. While this policy was initially intended to increase efficiency by 
reducing “cream-skimming” (i.e. targeted enrollment of healthier patients), the patient 
risk scores upon which risk adjusted payments are based have risen dramatically in recent 
years, suggesting plans may exaggerate risk scores for financial gain.36 While CMS does 
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audit risk scores, the number of audits has been low. Fraudulent risk scores cost an 
estimated $9 billion annually.36    
 
IMPLICATIONS  
The history of private plans in Medicare paints a picture of a policymaking 
process influenced by political ideology and insurance industry interests. In the political 
sphere, rhetoric around the impact of Medicare managed care policy has typically been 
shaped by deeply entrenched beliefs regarding efficiency, competition, and the role of 
government in health care.  
The existing literature suggests that policymakers need to develop a more 
nuanced and evidence-based approach to policymaking. However, this is an area in which 
stakeholder influence seems to have often outweighed empirical evidence in shaping the 
direction of policy. As researchers, our approach to the analysis of Medicare managed 
care policy is often an apolitical examination of policy design divorced from the political 
reality in which the policy was created. Yet failing to confront the fact that these policies 
exist within a complex political context will ultimately result in research that has little 
lasting impact. Medicare managed care payment and regulatory policy is, and will 
continue to be, an increasingly important area for further research. However, it is perhaps 
equally important to advance our understanding of the ways in which we, as researchers, 
can expand the impact of empirical evidence and support greater adoption of evidence-
based policies moving forward.  
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Figure 1. Medicare Managed Care Enrollment and Contracts, 1997-2018 
 
 
Notes: 
BBA: Balanced Budget Act (1997) 
BBRA: Balanced Budget Recovery Act (1999) 
BIPA: Benefits Improvement and Protection Act (2000) 
MMA: Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and Modernization Act (2003) 
MIPPA: Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act (2008) 
ACA: Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (2010) 
 
Source: Author’s analysis of data from Kaiser Family Foundation State Health Facts: Medicare. Available at: 
https://www.kff.org/state-category/medicare/medicare-advantage/ Accessed 19 June 2019. 
 
 
 
Table 1. Primer: Traditional Medicare versus Medicare Part C 
 
 Traditional Medicare Medicare Part C 
Eligibility Adults 65 years and older, those with 
a permanent disability, amyotrophic 
lateral sclerosis (ALS) or end-stage 
renal disease.  
Same as under traditional Medicare. 
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Financing  Part A: Earmarked payroll taxes 
go into the Hospital Insurance 
Trust Fund 
 Part B: General tax revenue, 
enrollee premiums  
 Part D: General tax revenue, 
enrollee premiums 
 A combination of payroll taxes, 
general tax revenue and 
enrollee premiums.  
Covered 
services 
 Part A: Hospital Coverage 
(inpatient care, skilled nursing 
facility, home health care, etc.) 
 Part B: Medical Coverage 
(physician and other providers’ 
services, outpatient care, 
durable medical equipment, 
etc.) 
 
 All services covered under 
traditional Medicare Parts A 
and B  
 Some plans may offer 
additional benefits, including 
dental and vision care, wellness 
and other services.  
 Beginning in 2020, plans can 
offer non-medical services, such 
as meal delivery.1 
Services not 
covered 
Uncovered services include (but are 
not limited to) dental, hearing and 
vision care, long-term care. 
Varies by plan.  
Out-of-pocket 
costs 
Premiums2 
 Part A: free for those eligible for 
Social Security benefits, 
$437/month for those not 
eligible 
 Part B: monthly premium of 
$135.50-$460.50 in 2019 (varies 
by income) 
 
Copayments, Coinsurance and 
Deductibles 
 Health care services provided 
under Parts A and B involve 
standardized out-of-pocket 
spending for all beneficiaries 
(e.g. $1,364 Part A deductible, 
$185 Part B deductible, 20% 
coinsurance for Part B services, 
etc.) 2 
 There is no limit on total annual 
out-of-pocket spending.  
 Many beneficiaries purchase 
additional Medigap coverage or 
have “wraparound” coverage 
through a retiree plan or 
Medicaid in order to cover 
some of the out-of-pocket costs 
Premiums 
 Standard Part B monthly 
premium of $135.50-$460.50 in 
2019 (varies depending on 
income). 
 Some plans charge an 
additional monthly premium on 
top of the Part B premium.  
 Some plans have no additional 
premium on top of the Part B 
premium.  
 Some plans have no additional 
premium and may also pay a 
portion of the Part B premium.  
 
Copayments, Coinsurance and 
Deductibles 
 Copayments, coinsurance and 
deductibles vary across plans 
and may vary within each plan 
from one year to the next. 
 Plans are required to limit total 
annual out-of-pocket spending 
on Part A and B services to 
$6,700. This applies to services 
provided by in-network 
providers only.3 
 23 
associated with traditional 
Medicare and to cover 
additional benefits.  
 In 2016, the average beneficiary 
spent $5,608 out-of-pocket.3  
Physician 
choice 
 Any provider willing to accept 
Medicare patients. 
 No referrals required for 
specialist services. 
 Plan design varies, but generally 
choice of providers is 
constrained via fixed provider 
networks. There are additional 
out-of-network fees associated 
with care provided by non-
network providers.  
 Some plans have additional 
restrictions, such as pre-
authorization requirements 
and/or referral requirements 
for specialist care.  
Provider 
reimbursement 
 Part A: Diagnosis-related 
groups 
 Part B: Fee-for-service 
reimbursement based on 
Medicare fee schedules 
determined via the resource-
based relative value scale.4  
 Following various reforms, 
some payments under Part A 
and B are now linked to patient 
outcomes, care quality and/or 
value. 
Provider payment rates are 
negotiated privately between 
insurers and health care providers 
and vary across insurers/plans.  
Interaction with 
Part D 
prescription 
drug coverage 
Standalone Part D coverage must be 
purchased separately.  
 Part D coverage (and the 
associated premium) may be 
included in the MA plan and MA 
premium (referred to as MA-PD 
plans). 88% of MA plans include 
Part D benefits.5  
 Some MA plans do not cover 
Part D benefits and require 
separate purchase of standalone 
Part D coverage.  
1 Neuman P, Jacobson GA. (2018) Medicare Advantage Checkup. NEJM. 379(22): 2163-2172. 
2 Medicare.gov. Medicare costs at a glance. https://www.medicare.gov/your-medicare-costs/medicare-
costs-at-a-glance Accessed 30 September 2019. 
3 Kaiser Family Foundation. An Overview of Medicare. The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation; 2019. 
Available at: https://www.kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/an-overview-of-medicare/  
4 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. Fee Schedules - General Information. 
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/FeeScheduleGenInfo/index.html  
Accessed September 27, 2019. 
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5 Kaiser Family Foundation. Fact Sheet: Medicare Advantage. The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation; 2017. 
Available at: http://files.kff.org/attachment/Fact-Sheet-Medicare-Advantage  
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Key Research Regarding Medicare Managed Care Plan Participation 
Reference Study period Key findings 
Adamache KW and Rossiter LF. 
The entry of HMOs in the 
Medicare market: Implications for 
TEFRA’s mandate. Inquiry. 1986; 
23(4): 349-364. 
1982 An increase in plan capitation rates of one standard 
deviation above the mean was associated with an 8% 
increase in the probability of market participation. 
Porell FW and Wallack SS. 
Medicare risk contracting: 
Determinants of market entry. 
Health Care Financing Review. 
Winter 1990; 12(2): 75-85. 
1986 Higher payment rates, greater Medicare managed 
care market concentration and lower market share in 
the non-Medicare managed care market were all 
associated with a greater probability of plan 
participation. 
Abraham J, Arora A, Gaynor M, 
and D Wholey. “Enter at Your 
Own Risk: HMO Participation 
and Enrollment in the Medicare 
Risk Market,” Economic Inquiry, 
2000, 38(3): 385-401. 
1990-1995 A $35 increase in a plan’s monthly capitation rate 
was associated with a 3% increased probability of 
market participation. Certain demographic factors, 
including the age structure of the population in a 
given market (proportion of the population 65-75 
years and proportion of the population 75+ years), 
were also found to be associated with plan 
participation. 
Pai CW and Clement DG. Recent 
Determinants of New Entry into a 
Medicare Risk Contract: A 
Diversification Strategy. Inquiry. 
Spring 1999; 36(1): 78-89. 
1995 Higher payment rates and overall growth in managed 
care enrollment were statistically significantly 
associated with an increased probability of a new 
plan entering a market 
Brown RS and Gold MR. What 
Drives Medicare Managed Care 
Growth? Health Affairs. 
November/December 1999; 
18(6): 140-149. 
 
1996-1997 Key market characteristics associated with plan 
participation include payment rates, historic presence 
of non-Medicare managed care in the area, 
proportion of the over-65 population with Medicaid 
or employer-subsidized coverage, and presence of 
large physician groups in the county. Wide variation 
in capitation rates across counties led some plans to 
selectively offer plans in only those counties with 
higher rates. 
Glavin MPV, Tompkins CP, 
Wallack SS and Altman SH. An 
Examination of Factors in the 
Withdrawal of Managed Care 
1998 A decrease in the average payment rate equal to one 
standard deviation below the mean increased the 
probability of a plan exiting the market by nearly 8 
percent. Plans with for-profit status and lower market 
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Plans from the Medicare+Choice 
program. Inquiry. Winter 
2002/2003; 39(4): 341-354. 
share had a significantly higher predicted probability 
of exiting the market. 
United States General Accounting 
Office. Many Factors Contribute 
to Recent Withdrawals; Plan 
Interest Continues. (GAO 99-91). 
Washington, DC; 1999. 
 
United States General Accounting 
Office. Medicare+Choice: Plan 
Withdrawals Indicate Difficulty of 
Providing Choice While 
Achieving Savings. (GAO 00-183) 
Washington, DC; 2000. 
 
United States General Accounting 
Office. Recent Payment Increases 
Had Little Effect on Benefits or 
Plan Availability in 2001. (GAO 
02-202) Washington, DC; 2001. 
 
1999-2001 Newer plans, plans with fewer enrollees, plans that 
struggled to establish adequate provider networks, 
and plans locating in areas with larger competitors 
were more likely to exit the market following the 
implementation of the BBA. 
Halpern R. M+C Plan County 
Exit Decisions 1999-2001: 
Implications for Payment Policy. 
Health Care Financing Review. 
Spring 2005; 26(3): 105-123. 
1999-2001 The introduction of payment floors in the BBA 
(which increased plan payments in areas with lower 
average fee-for-service costs) was significantly 
associated with a lower likelihood of a plan exiting a 
county. 
Cabral M, Geruso M, Mahoney 
N. Do larger health insurance 
subsidies benefit patients or 
producers? Evidence from 
Medicare Advantage. American 
Economic Review. 2018; 108(8): 
2048-87. 
1997-2003 Among plans receiving higher payments via the 
introduction of payment floors, only around half of 
those higher payments were passed on to enrollees in 
the form of reduced premiums (45%) and additional 
benefits (9%). 
Hurley RE, Strunk BC and 
Grossman JM. Geography and 
Destiny: Local-Market 
Perspectives on Developing 
Medicare Advantage Regional 
Plans. Health Affairs. July/August 
2005; 24(4): 1014-1021. 
2004 The ability to selectively enter counties with higher 
payment rates viewed as a key factor enabling MA 
plans to be profitable. Provider consolidation, local 
health system capacity and health plan leverage in 
negotiating provider contracts were other important 
factors. 
Frakt AB, Pizer SD and Feldman 
R. Payment Reduction and 
Medicare Private Fee-for-Service 
Plans. Health Care Financing 
2001-2008 A reduction in MA benchmark rates to 100 percent of 
average fee-for-service costs would reduce private 
fee-for-service plan market entry by 85 percent. 
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Review. Spring 2009; 30 (3): 15-
24. 
Song Z, Landrum MB, Chernew 
ME. Competitive bidding in 
Medicare Advantage: Effect of 
benchmark changes on plan bids. 
Journal of Health Economics. 
December 2013. 36(6): 1301-
1312 
2006-2010 Plan bids rise as benchmark rates increase: An 
increase in county benchmark rates of $1 was 
associated with a $0.53 increase in plan bids. 
Duggan M, Starc A, Vabson B. 
Who benefits when the 
government pays more? Pass-
through in the Medicare 
Advantage program. J Public 
Econ 2016; 141: 50-67. 
2007-2011 Only about one-eighth of reimbursement increases to 
MA plans over the study period was passed on to MA 
enrollees through expanded coverage.  
Afendulis CC, Landrum MB, 
Chernew ME. Impact of the 
Affordable Care Act on Medicare 
Advantage Plan Availability and 
Enrollment. Health Services 
Research. December 2012. 
47(6):2339-2352 
2010-2011 Counties expected to receive the lowest payment rate 
increases or payment rate reductions following the 
ACA experienced a greater decrease in the number of 
plans offered. No similar relationship at the contract 
level was found. 
Pelech D. Paying more for less? 
Insurer competition and health 
plan generosity in the Medicare 
Advantage program. Journal of 
Health Economics. 2018; 61: 77-
92. 
 
2007-2012 Reductions in county-level plan offerings (PFFS 
plans) following the MIPPA were associated with an 
increase in expected enrollee out-of-pocket spending 
and higher premiums for PFFS plans. 
Layton TJ, Ryan AM. Higher 
Incentive Payments in Medicare 
Advantage’s Pay-for-Performance 
Program Did Not Improve 
Quality But Did Increase Plan 
Offerings. Health Services 
Research. December 2015. 
50(6):1810-28. 
2009-2014 Double bonus payments under the Medicare Quality 
Bonus Payment Demonstration were associated with 
a 5.8 percent increase in the number of plans offered 
in a county. 
 
 
